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Abstract 
Financial scandals are not new, but their growing sophistication, complexity and ability to inflict widespread damage to people 
and entire economies is of huge concern. Our study takes a case of embezzlement involving 1.58 billion Baht (USD 52 million) 
at King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology Ladkrabang (KMITL), Thailand, to examine what could have been done to avoid its 
occurrence. We interviewed the key commanders of Division 1, Crime Suppression Division (CSD), Central Investigation 
Bureau, The Royal Thai Police, Thailand. We interviewed five internal auditors to see what kind of good internal controls, 
internal auditing system and governance should have been in place. We furthered our study by interviewing top-ranked executive 
management of a private educational institution to see how its internal control systems compare with those of public institutions. 
The KMITL case shows the need to examine the adequacy of current standards for internal controls, auditing systems and 
governance. 
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1. Introduction 
From the past two decades, numerous accounts of corporate accounting/financial scandals have made the 
headlines. Among the most notorious cases are Enron in 2001 and Lehman Brothers in 2008. One interesting fact is 
that most of these big companies committed fraud in financial reports that were audited by the Big Four auditing 
firms. This raises questions on how it was possible to scam the Big Four, whose role was to assure the reliability of 
those reports. The financial scandal we take into consideration is the embezzlement of 1.58 billion baht (USD 52 
million) from King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology Ladkrabang (KMITL), Thailand. KMITL is a leading public 
research and education institution known as the top-ranked engineering institute in Thailand. It has enjoyed long-
term and ongoing support from Japan as well as from the Thai government. The embezzlement at KMITL raises the 
issue of internal controls within the institute and the controlling systems of all public institutions. The questions 
arised are how did it happen, why didn’t anyone know about it or notice it earlier, and did something occur behind 
the scenes that have not been made public? Our study examines this case with the main purpose of deriving methods 
to prevent such case from occurring at other educational institutions and related entities. We would like to discover 
about what we could have been done to avert the embezzlement. The study starts by providing brief details of the 
case from interviews with key commanders of Division 1, Crime Suppression Division (CSD), Central Investigation 
Bureau, The Royal Thai Police, Thailand. We additionally interviewed five independent internal auditors to see 
what kind of internal controls, internal auditing system and governance should have been in place. Their suggestions 
and comments are included in the final part of this study. Even though some questions may be left unanswered, the 
findings are rich enough to contribute sound suggestions and conclusions to organizations as a whole. 
2. Literature Review 
Fraud is among the top concerns of corporate executives. In recent years many organizations, public and private, 
have faced some kind of scandal. Fraud can be defined as a misrepresentation of facts whose purpose is to persuade 
a party to act in a way that causes injury or damage to that party (Harrison et al. 2011, 233). A model of the Fraud 
Triangle, created by criminologist Donald R. Cressey, represents the three factors that push an ordinary person to 
commit fraud (Fig. 1). If a person has all three elements; motivation, opportunity and rationalization, a high 
possibility to commit fraud exists (Harrison, Horngern, Thomas & Suwardy, 2011, 234). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Fraud Triangle (UC Merced, 2012) 
 
The common types of corporate fraud are misappropriation of assets, fraudulent financial reporting and 
corruption. Misappropriation of assets is found to be the most common fraud. According to the 2008 ACFE Report 
to the Nation on Occupational Fraud & Abuse, asset misappropriation accounted for 88.7 per cent of the incidents 
reported. Corruption came second at 27.4 per cent, followed by fraudulent financial reporting at 10.3 per cent (Ernst 
& Young 2009, 1). Research shows that the typical organization loses five percent of annual revenue due to 
employee fraud (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc., 2014). Fraudulent activities last an average of 18 
months before detection.  
Rational choice theory is used to explain the existence of criminology. This theory rests on several assumptions, 
one of which is individualism. Offenders see themselves as individuals who must maximize their goals; they think 
only about themselves and how to advance their self-interest (Becker, 1968). The rational choice theory has been 
adopted to aid and focus on situational crime prevention. While embezzlement and other acts of fraud occur in 
entities, good internal controls will help reduce the scale and frequency of financial criminology in a business. 
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Rational choice theory posits that fraudsters make rational decisions based on ‘strategic thinking’; thus, the 
theory rejects deterministic and pathological explanations for criminality in favour of reasoned explanations for 
criminal behavior. This gives the goal-oriented, rational and everyday aspects of human activity. In this respect, 
rational choice theory can be distinguished from traditional criminological theories that presuppose that fraudsters 
are different from ‘normal’ people. Even so, rational choice theory may have become popular among criminologists, 
but not so much because it offers an attractive alternative to what they consider as overly deterministic or 
pathological explanations for criminality, but rather for its promise of more effective strategies and tactics to combat 
crime (Clarke, 1992, Clarke & Cornish, 1985). 
Internal control can be defined as ‘a system of procedures implemented by company management. It is designed 
to follow objectives such as: to safeguard assets, encourage employees to follow company policy, promote 
operational efficiency, ensure accurate reliable accounting records and comply with legal requirements’ (Harrison et 
al. 2011, 237). The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) is one of the 
main sources of providing frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management, internal controls and fraud 
deterrence (COSO 2011). During recent years, the concern over fraud and the focus on risk management have 
highly increased. In response, COSO with PricewaterhouseCoopers developed an updated, readily usable framework 
for management that was published in 2004, the Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework (COSO 
2004, V.).  
3. Research method 
We employed qualitative research by interviewing four key commanders of Division 1, Crime Suppression 
Division (CSD), Central Investigation Bureau, The Royal Thai Police, Thailand. Taking place just two months after 
the embezzlement was exposed; the interview focused on obtaining a deep understanding of the case through 
questions designed around four points: the fraudsters’ motivation, fraud process, fraud detection, and the police 
observations.   The interview took about three hours at the CSD office. 
We then interviewed five independent internal auditors to see what kind of effective internal controls, internal 
auditing system and governance should have been in place. The internal auditors, all members of The Institute of 
Internal Auditors of Thailand, each have more than 10 years experience with internal control systems. Their names 
remain anonymous per their request. Our investigative questions asked their opinions on 1) the weakness in 
KMITL’s financial process and 2) procedures that could have helped to detect and prevent the embezzlement. This 
study concludes with their suggestions. 
As this is qualitative research, the data are collected from the interviews with knowledgeable individuals  who 
are well-experienced in their fields; thus, the data are considered highly relevant and reliable. 
4. Research findings and discussions 
4.1 Circumstances in the case of King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology Ladkrabang, Thailand 
The embezzlement came to light in early December 2014, after a KMITL executive requisitioned funds for 
approved projects through the issuance of cashier’s checks drawn on KMITL’s normal account at the Bank of 
Ayutthaya. The bank refused to issue the checks, citing an insufficient balance in the institute’s account, despite the 
last balance printed in its saving passbook showing more than enough funds to cover the requested checks. After 
finding several abnormal financial transactions, KMITL contacted the police. Their preliminary investigation, by the 
officers from Division 1, Crime Suppression Division (CSD), Central Investigation Bureau, The Royal Thai Police, 
Thailand, discovered THB 3 billion (100 million USD) in lost funds from the institute’s bank accounts that had been 
transferred to the accounts of several people. Eventually the investigation revealed that THB 1.58 billion (USD 52 
million) had been embezzled from the institute since 2012.   
On 16 December 2014, KMITL’s Acting Rector asked the police at the Crime Suppression Division (CSD) to 
investigate all bank accounts that had been closed by the Finance Director. The officers found two withdrawals 
totalling THB 80 million (USD 2.5 million): THB 50 million (USD 1.5 million) deposited at a commercial bank, 
and THB 30 million (USD 1 million) at another bank. The Finance Director defended the transfers by saying the 
other banks were paying higher interest rates; one of the transfers was made at the suggestion of that bank’s branch 
42   Kanitsorn Terdpaopong and Jomdet Trimek /  Procedia Economics and Finance  28 ( 2015 )  39 – 45 
manager. After the investigation, Finance Director and the bank branch manager were arrested for allegedly 
embezzling KMITL funds. 
Part of the THB 80 million (USD 2.5 million) was transferred into a nominee account belonging to a messenger 
at the institute who had a close relationship with the Finance Director and bank branch manager. It turned out that he 
had been hired by someone, who seems to be a ‘prime suspect’, to open the account as a conduit for the money to be 
transferred to other accounts. This suspect was found to be extraordinarily wealthy for no reason: he bought over 40 
acres of land, established a financial company and had investments in entertainment ventures valued at more than 
THB 100 million (USD 3 million). The police issued an arrest warrant for this suspect, but he fled the country. Early 
in January 2015, the Anti-Money Laundering Office seized assets worth about THB 100 million from parties 
suspected of being involved in the embezzlement. 
Later the police interrogated 26 more people and found that about THB 500 million (USD 16 million) had been 
transferred out of KMITL’s bank accounts, while the rest of the money was still being located. 
KMITL empowered the CSD to take legal action against three former KMITL executives. The police charged the 
executives, including the former rector, with theft, document forgery, abuse of power, negligence of duty, and 
money laundering. They were released on bail. Another 11 persons are alleged to have been involved and face 
charges of theft, forgery of official documents, embezzlement, negligence, and money laundering. Eight of them are 
under detention, including the former branch manager. The rest are still at large. 
4.2 The interview of internal auditors 
We interviewed five independent internal auditors to see what kind of effective internal controls, internal 
auditing system and governance should have been in place. Our main questions are 1) in your opinion, what are the 
weak points of the financial process in the case of KMITL? and 2) what would have helped to detect and prevent the 
fraud in this case?   
Their views of the institute’s internal control system were unanimous: KMITL’s internal control system was 
rather weak. Even though the institute had established a sound internal system, it lacked monitoring; managers could 
overrule it with impunity – and some did. Auditing systems, both internal and external, were also weak: merely a 
yearly routine done according to the rules of the institute. The process of auditors’ independently collecting data was 
facilitated and corrupted by the fraudsters – a key indicator of potential fraud that went unnoticed as an abnormal 
situation. Management override was made possible by the lack of financial duties segregated: a convenient 
facilitator of the fraud. 
A second point of concern voiced by the interviewees is the lack of a supportive internal control environment at 
the institute. Communication of internal control policies, practices and procedures was minimal. Since the institute 
receives government funds, it should carefully consider the implementation of internal controls and effectively carry 
out the processes of an internal control system. Risk management should be taken seriously as a critical 
responsibility of management. Having internal control policies, practices and procedures established and 
communicated would create a sound and a solid organizational culture of internal control among the institute’s 
financial and accounting staff. 
5. Discussion 
Rather than simply responding to fraud, recent attention to its prevention has focused on ways to modify physical 
and social environments of all educational institutes. This study found a negative association between the level of 
weakness in an institute’s internal controls and its level of fraud, i.e., the weaker the entity’s internal controls, the 
higher the incidence of fraud. From our interviews, it is concluded that the implementation of prevention and early 
detection could have been implemented by KMITL. All respondents mentioned the establishment and 
implementation of internal controls as  to fraud prevention. The scope of internal control systems is relevant to the 
nature, size and complexity of an entity; the more complex the business, the higher the level of internal controls it 
needs. This is to provide reasonable assurance to management that errors or fraud will not occur without being 
detected. We see that the benefits of internal control procedures should outweigh their costs. Furthermore, fraud 
cases are usually complex and require special expertise to investigate the underlying issues. An organization should 
notify its responsible unit of a suspected case to determine if further investigation is needed and minimize loss if 
fraud is found. Several procedures could have helped KMITL to prevent or detect the fraud in its earliest stages: 
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x Segregation of duties: The segregation of duties is the design of tasks whose discrete steps are properly 
segregated so the same person does not record, approve and implement financial transactions. 
Segregation prevents management override in an organization. We suggest that no one should have full 
control of the financial process from beginning to the end. 
x Regular bank reconcilements: Bank accounts should be reconciled and checked at least on a monthly 
basis by a supervisor. Statements must be requested directly from the bank’s head office. Branch-
provided or informal bank statements should not be accepted. Many institutes conduct daily 
reconcilements. 
x Technical assistance: An effectively designed internal control system is a vital element of fraud 
prevention. KMITL can benefit from outside experts to assist it in improving its internal systems. It is 
generally easier for an impartial third party to identify shortcomings than for operational staff 
subjected to office politics. An internal control assessment should determine the appropriate ongoing 
controls and then run a system check by operational or audit staff later. 
x Supervisory committee/internal audit department and routine auditing implementation: The 
supervisory committee or internal audit department should oversee an entity’s internal control system. 
Audits and verifications must be performed in a timely manner and under controlled conditions; the 
auditors should gather all information by themselves and verify every explanation given by the 
employees. An annual audit and regulatory examination should be performed to establish and maintain 
good governance. Good internal controls provide an environment in which good employees are not 
tempted to do something against the standard procedures because they are aware of the importance and 
effectiveness of an entity’s control systems. 
x A sense of belonging for the employees: The KMITL case leaves unanswered questions, such as why 
this case was not revealed much sooner, why now, how no one knew or noticed the immoral and 
abnormal financial transactions earlier, why the internal control and internal auditing systems failed 
and what management had been doing while it was taking place. We see many ways in which public 
organization management differs from that of private organizations, but one important commonality is 
the quality of staff morale and loyalty and its effect on performance. An organization should build its 
staff’s sense of belonging. It can be accomplished when employees feel that the work they do is 
valued, makes a difference and contributes to the overall team or organization. This could be done in 
many different ways, for instance, by sharing ownership, fostering two-way communication, showing 
appreciation and incubating relationships. A work environment needs to foster collaboration. If the 
staffs possess a sense of ownership for the organization, they will safeguard its assets, and feel 
commitment and loyalty, resulting in fewer and less severe incidents of fraud. 
x A whistleblower system: This mechanism enables individuals to voice concerns internally in a 
responsible and effective manner when they discover information that they believe represents serious 
malpractice. If a whistleblower policy and system are set out effectively, with detailed advice and 
guidance, all staff will recognize that they are protected from victimization, harassment or disciplinary 
action when making a disclosure in good faith. In the case of KMITL, we believe that some individuals 
in the finance or related departments may have noticed discrepancies, but they did not know how to 
report their observations and to whom, and may have inferred that doing so would put them at risk of 
being terminated. 
6. Conclusion 
The KMITL case shows us the need to examine the adequacy of current standards of internal controls, auditing 
systems and governance. It urges us to establish financial fraud policy and processes to prevent and detect its 
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occurrence. The effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability, and compliance with laws and regulations are 
to be addressed when policies, practices and procedures are discussed and established. The eight pillars in the COSO 
cube can help an institute improve its internal control system’s effectiveness. For instance, referring to the first 
pillar, internal environment, KMITL should open the communication channels between the institute and its staff to 
allow them to acknowledge the internal control environment of the institute. By establishing effective policies, 
practices and procedures, the institute can create a sound internal environment that discourages fraud. It should have 
risk assessment, the fourth pillar, with a deep analysis of the likelihood and impact of risk, when to avoid it, when to 
adapt, and when to share risks. The institute should consider the sixth pillar, control activities, by carefully 
considering all internal risks. Information flow should go across, up and down the institute: pillar seven. For the 
eighth pillar, monitoring, the institute should give importance to local monitoring. We found that the lack of 
effective internal controls is a key element of financial fraud. Our findings will help to develop and improve the 
quality of risk management of educational institutions, and they can be applied to any kind of organization. The 
results provide guidelines for establishing operational activities to assist organizations in identifying vulnerabilities, 
designing and implementing controls and monitoring the effectiveness of those controls. 
However, we need to understand that while internal controls provide reasonable assurance of an institute’s 
objectives, limitations exist. Internal controls may not be able to prevent bad judgment or external events; human 
judgment in decision-making can be faulty owing to bias and an ability of management to override internal controls; 
and other persons and/or external parties may be able to circumvent controls through collusion. In many cases, 
external events are beyond an organization’s control. 
It is undeniable that management has a significant role in setting policies, practices and procedures to prevent 
and detect fraud. Our findings have implications for management, policymakers, standard-setters and internal 
auditors. Our suggestions could assist managers in being well aware of their responsibilities in terms of an 
organization’s risk management and fraud prevention. For policymakers and regulators, our findings can be used as 
a tool to develop better systems. To reduce the risk of material fraud and embezzlement, policy makers and 
regulators could also consider ways to improve the accuracy of their material weakness disclosures. Internal auditors 
as key persons who monitor and detect malpractice in an organization could benefit from our suggestions in 
monitoring their existing internal controls and auditing systems, and oversee management in general. This study has 
left many areas uncovered, such as an in-depth analysis of internal control and auditing systems, and investigating 
the external auditing systems of public organizations, particularly educational institutions. These areas represent 
avenues for future research. 
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